

reflective equilibrium as one part in a triumvirate of knowledge. Surely, this is the most superior way intuition will be able to see itself in the future, especially if it is to be practiced as it is in southern fundamentalism, where the modals are constructed on 'arm-chair obtainable data' (284).

On the whole, the book engages its reader with its clear presentation of arguments both for and against intuition, as it relates to cp and ph. If there is a weakness here it is that the work does not enough consider the role of computation in the cp-ph debate. Nevertheless, students and scholars in both psychology and philosophy will find this book compelling and educating for some time to come.

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*Faith Beyond Reason:*  
*A Kierkegaardian Account.*  
Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans  
Publishing Company 1998. Pp. viii + 167.  
US\$20.00. ISBN 0-8028-4555-X.

In light of the long, sad history of religious strife — a history that shows little sign of ending soon — Evans's topic could not be more important: Is religious faith rationally criticizable? Any two groups at war because of fundamentally opposed religious commitments have only their shared human reason as common ground. But if, as Evans claims, faith is not always rationally criticizable, then the warring parties may be unable to use that common ground to reconcile their differences.

Evans defends a Kierkegaardian version of what is commonly called 'fideism,' the view that religious faith is at odds with, beyond, or impervious to human reason. While conceding that 'the question of whether this label ["fideist"] does or does not apply to a particular thinker is not a very interesting one' (57), Evans discusses several arguably fideistic views associated with Aquinas, Kant, Wittgenstein, Plantinga, and others before coming down in favor of Kierkegaard's view. He then uses this Kierkegaardian position to argue that natural theology cannot by itself discover truths about God and that the abundance of apparently pointless suffering is not good evidence against theism.

The book belongs to a series meant 'to introduce students and educated general readers' to issues concerning reason and religion, and, accordingly, its clear and accessible text does not pretend to break much new ground. The well-written exposition does, however, contain at least two notable flaws that may mislead some of its intended readers: Evans describes a particular argument as 'formally valid' (118) when in fact the argument commits the fallacy of denying the antecedent, and his discussion of externalism and internalism in epistemology (146-8) confuses the conditions for justified belief (which the internalist claims are entirely internal to the believer's consciousness) with the conditions for knowledge (which *no one* claims are entirely internal to the believer's consciousness).

According to the book's central Kierkegaardian thesis, human reason is radically distorted by sinfulness and is thus especially incompetent in religious matters: '[T]he fideist typically rejects the rationalist assumption that reason is our best or even our only guide to truth, at least with respect to religious truth. The fideist sees human reason as ... damaged in some way ... linked to the *sinfulness* of human beings' (9). More to the point, as Evans reads Kierkegaard, it is because of the sinful 'pride' and 'selfishness' of human reason that rationalists reject the most important element of *Christian* theism: the incarnation of God in Christ (96-100). The problem for religious pluralism, of course, is that not only rationalists reject the incarnation; so do devout theists from the Jewish and Islamic faiths. Evans never asks why pride and selfishness cause those Jews and Muslims to doubt the Christian revelation but not to doubt the uniqueness, personhood, goodness, omniscience, eternality, creative power, and redemptive intentions of God: what about the incarnation makes it unacceptable to their sinful rational faculties when those same faculties manage to accept a dozen other theistic doctrines also embraced by Christianity? He likewise never considers the dialectical consequences, for any dispute between Christians and others, of the *ad hominem* rejoinder 'The reason you're not a Christian is that your thinking is warped by pride and selfishness.' If history is any guide, those consequences are apt to be significant.

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