A Dilemma for Skeptics

Stephen Maitzen

RESUMEN
Varios argumentos escépticos importantes utilizan historias de engaño —el genio maligno, sueños que parecen reales, cerebros en cubetas, “Matrix”, etc.— para mostrar que no sabemos nada sobre el mundo exterior. Planteo un dilema para esos argumentos: o bien (1) no muestran más que la posibilidad lógica de error, en cuyo caso no son una amenaza para el conocimiento falible, el único tipo de conocimiento del mundo externo que la mayoría de nosotros pensamos que tenemos en cualquier caso; o (2) se autoderrotan porque deben conceder que tenemos conocimiento empírico o creencias justificadas exactamente del mismo tipo que tienen también que negar-nos completamente.

PALABRAS CLAVE: conocimiento, escepticismo, engaño, error, soñar, alucinación, fallibilismo, posibilidad, Descartes, R., Moore, G.E.

ABSTRACT
Several important skeptical arguments use stories of deception—the evil demon, realistic dreams, a brain in a vat, “The Matrix”—to show that we have no first-order knowledge of the external world. I pose a dilemma for such arguments: either (1) they demonstrate no more than the logical possibility of error, in which case they fail to threaten fallible knowledge, the only kind of knowledge of the external world most of us think we have anyway; or (2) they defeat themselves because they must grant us empirical knowledge or justified beliefs of the very kind they must also entirely deny us.

KEYWORDS: Knowledge, Skepticism, Deception, Error, Dreaming, Hallucination, Fallibilism, Possibility, Descartes, R., Moore, G.E.

I. INTRODUCTION

Some of the most enduring skeptical arguments use stories of deception—the evil demon, realistic dreams, a brain in a vat, “the Matrix”—to show that we have no first-order knowledge of the external world. I pose a dilemma for such arguments: either (1) they establish no more than the logical possibility of error,
in which case they fail to threaten fallible knowledge, the only kind of knowledge of the external world most of us think we have any-way; or (2) they defeat themselves because they must grant us empirical knowledge or justified beliefs of the very kind they must also entirely deny us. Either way they pose no significant threat. The dialectically most interesting skeptical strategies attack our common-sense claims of knowledge while invoking only those requirements on knowledge endorsed by common sense. In trying to expose a serious flaw in such strategies, my project belongs to the enterprise that Alex Byrne helpfully labels “expose-the-skeptic” [Byrne (2004), p. 301].

My targets are Cartesian — that is, deception-centered — arguments for the claim that we have no first-order knowledge of the external world. Well-known examples include Descartes’s dream and evil-demon arguments in the Meditations; Keith Lehrer’s argument in “Why Not Scepticism?” (1971), invoking the possibility of superintelligent alien tricksters; Barry Stroud’s dream argument in The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism (1984); and Keith DeRose’s “Argument from Ignorance” (1995), which appeals to the brain-in-a-vat scenario. I distinguish these targets from arguments that defend skepticism about second-order knowledge, such as my knowledge that I know I have hands. I find such skepticism less interesting because first-order knowledge doesn’t require second-order knowledge: you don’t need to possess epistemic concepts such as knowing (let alone knowing that you know) — or even have those concepts “available” to you¹ — in order to know you have hands. I distinguish them as well from skeptical arguments directed against other epistemic attitudes, such as justified belief or the attitude that Crispin Wright calls “warranted” belief.² Nevertheless, of course, if my target skeptical arguments fail to threaten knowledge, as I will argue they do, then they must also fail to threaten any conceptually necessary condition for knowledge such as justification (assuming that justification is indeed necessary). Finally, I distinguish my targets from skeptical arguments that invoke nihilistic hypotheses, such as those offered by Peter Unger (1980), who argues for skepticism from our inability to rule out the soundness of every (or some particular) sorites argument for our own nonexistence; if Unger’s skeptical scenario obtains, we aren’t even around to be deceived.³

I will discuss the first horn of the dilemma only briefly, since I have nothing substantial to add to what others have already said concerning it; I will instead spend the bulk of my time establishing the second horn. According to the first horn, any merely logically possible skeptical hypothesis doesn’t threaten the kind of knowledge of the external world most of us think we have, namely, fallible or defeasible knowledge—knowledge we can possess even if there remains the logical possibility that we’re mistaken. In other words, according to the first horn of the anti-skeptical dilemma the ordinary concept of knowledge allows me to know a proposition p even if in some possible world I mistakenly believe that p. As evidence in favor of this claim
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about our concept of knowledge, notice that there’s nothing outlandish about asserting “Sure, I could have been mistaken about such-and-such, but I’m not; on the contrary, I know that such-and-such.” Indeed, in his book-length defense of empirical knowledge against skeptical attack, Peter Klein begins by explicitly assuming that one’s knowledge of any external-world proposition \( p \) is compatible with the logical possibility that \( \sim p \). Klein emphasizes that empirical knowledge “does not rest upon entailing evidence” [Klein (1981), pp. 14-15], and he cites Roderick Chisholm [(1973), p. 232] to the same effect.4

The skeptic may object that, having granted the logical possibility of scenarios in which \( \sim p \), would-be knowers must rule out such scenarios as a precondition for knowing that \( p \). Various philosophers have objected to the skeptic’s making it a precondition for our knowing that \( p \) that we first rule out any scenarios in which \( \sim p \),5 but I would raise a different objection: why, in order to know that \( p \), must we rule out (or even be able to rule out) merely logical possibilities in which \( \sim p \)? Leave aside whether we must rule them out antecedently to our knowing that \( p \) or, instead, concurrently with or as a consequence of our knowing that \( p \). Why must we rule them out at all? Fallible knowledge, again, is unthreatened by the mere logical possibility of error, and thus it requires ruling out contrary possibilities only when those possibilities are more than merely logical.6

The upshot, then, is that an effective skeptical argument requires a skeptical alternative that is not only incompatible with knowledge but also more than just logically possible.7 Some important epistemologists seem to appreciate this requirement, including Ernest Sosa:

Skeptics propose scenarios of radical deception: the brain in a vat, Descartes’s evil demon, Hollywood’s Matrix. Such radical scenarios are often dismissed as “irrelevant alternatives” to our familiar common sense […]. Why, exactly, do they fail the test of relevance? According to one popular view, a possibility is relevant only if it is not too remote, only if it might really happen. Possibilities like that of the evil demon or the brain in a vat are said to pose no real threat, being so remote [Sosa (2005), p. 7].

I see Sosa’s restriction of relevant alternatives to those that “might really happen” as having at least the flavor of my claim that mere logical possibilities are too weak to threaten fallible knowledge. On this view, an effective skeptical attack on our external-world knowledge requires a skeptical alternative drawn from what is actual, because only what is actual can serve to distinguish what “might really happen” from what is only logically possible. The skeptic needs, then, to invoke some epistemically disabling condition that we in fact experience, such as hallucination, illusion, or dreaming.

I will argue, however, that any skeptical argument relying on more realistic alternatives is self-defeating. I develop an objection reminiscent of one
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raised by G. E. Moore, but my objection applies more broadly than Moore’s and avoids a rebuttal that succeeds against his. For economy I focus on the dream alternative, but my criticism applies to any alternative that counts as realistic in the sense required by a plausible skeptical argument.

II. THE DREAM ARGUMENT AS SELF-DEFEATING

For Sosa, the dream alternative compares favorably to less realistic skeptical scenarios:

Of all familiar [skeptical] alternatives, only one cannot be dismissed so easily: the most famous of all, the dream alternative. Unlike being fooled by a demon, or brain-envatted, dreaming is a daily part of our lives. [...] The dream argument stands out because the dream possibility is too close for comfort [Sosa (2005), p. 7].

Unlike merely fanciful skeptical devices, then, the dream argument invokes a really possible, and not just logically possible, scenario of deception.

Given that starting-point, however, the argument suffers from a defect perhaps first noticed by Moore [Moore (1959), pp. 248-249]. A plausible dream argument needs us to admit that we have experienced realistic stretches of experience that seemed veridical when they occurred but that we later discovered were illusory. Yet in order to support a skeptical conclusion the argument must assume that one can never tell that one is not dreaming; it has to assume the indiscernibility of waking life and dreaming, something Descartes explicitly assumes in Meditations I: “there are never any certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep” (quoted in Stroud (1984), p. 11). The skeptic’s argument might seem to require only the weaker and more plausible premise “I sometimes can’t tell that I’m dreaming.” But in order to derive from that premise a genuinely skeptical conclusion, the skeptic needs a second premise to the effect that, for all I can tell, now is one of those occasions on which I’m dreaming, i.e., I can’t tell that it isn’t. Because “now” is indexical, that second premise is equivalent to the claim that I can’t ever tell that I’m not dreaming (see also Blumenfeld and Blumenfeld (1978), pp. 243-244).

If Descartes’s indiscernibility assumption is true, however, neither can we know that we have ever dreamed, assuming that we construe dreaming as different from—because it is in general epistemically inferior to—waking life. If we can never know that we’re not dreaming, then we can never know what the dream argument assumes we’ve all discovered: that dreaming is such a poor way of detecting your environment as to deprive you of knowledge of that environment while you’re dreaming. Hence the dream argument cannot properly begin where I have claimed it must: from our acknowledgement that we have undergone realistic but illusory states of experience. The same criticism applies to analogous skeptical arguments that depend on citing facts about convincing hal-
lucinations and other commonplace illusions while insisting on their
discernibility from real perception: if ex hypothesi hallucinations and
illusions differ from veridical experience, then we have no reason to
believe we have ever hallucinated or encountered illusions unless we can
sometimes distinguish those states of experience from veridical ones.

If, as the skeptic says, knowing that we’re not dreaming, hallucinating,
or otherwise encountering an illusion is a necessary but unsatisfiable condi-
tion for knowing anything a posteriori, then we can’t know that there is any
such thing as dreaming, hallucinating, or otherwise encountering an illusion,
since those states are known to be illusions only a posteriori if at all. The
same points hold even if we replace knowledge with a weaker attitude such
as justified (or warranted) belief: if our having justified a posteriori beliefs
requires our justifiedly believing that we’re not in any of those unfavorable
conditions, a requirement the skeptic says we can’t ever meet, then we can’t
justifiedly believe that we have ever dreamed, hallucinated, or encountered
an illusion. Finally, if we merely believe, but not justifiedly, that we have ex-
perienced those conditions, then the object of our belief hardly belongs in an
argument for anything, including skepticism (see also ibid., p. 240). Indeed,
if we merely believe that we have dreamed, then the skeptic’s argument ought
to persuade us to give up that belief, since on the skeptic’s own showing we
have no good reason for holding it.

III. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES

Skeptics might object that they can simply assume what common sense
assumes — that we have indeed dreamed, hallucinated, and encountered illu-
sions — and then argue from those assumptions to a skeptical conclusion.9
But this reductio argument misfires because of something else that common
sense assumes: contrary to Descartes, we can often tell the difference be-
tween waking and dreaming. Indeed, we presuppose the ability to tell the dif-
fERENCE whenever we entertain the thought that we have had convincing
dreams that we mistook for reality. Even though the assumption that we have
dreamed, and suchlike, is commonsensical, Descartes’s assumption about the
permanent indiscernibility of wakefulness and dreaming clearly isn’t, and
thus common sense can reject Descartes’s assumption rather than accept the
reductio argument’s skeptical conclusion.

Philosophers sometimes defend the asymmetry in the skeptic’s argu-
ment by insisting that we can sometimes tell we are dreaming, hallucinating,
or suchlike when we are — for events seem to violate physical laws or oth-
erwise unfold disjointedly — even if we can’t ever tell we’re not dreaming,
hallucinating, or suchlike, for the absence of those signs is no guarantee.10
But this asymmetry claim presumes that we know or justifiedly believe that
genuine perception differs from dreaming, and suchlike, in that genuinely perceived events obey physical laws and unfold seamlessly, while dreamt and hallucinated events often don’t. By the skeptic’s own lights, however, even if real and illusory states differ in that way, we can’t know or justifiedly believe that they do. By the same token, my admitting “Only now can I tell that my experience was unreal” presumes “I can tell now that my experience is real.” In order genuinely to assert the claim “I’ve had realistic dreams,” I conceptually must take myself to be grasping the world reliably — i.e., not to be dreaming — at the time I assert the claim.

A respected introductory textbook anticipates something like my point and appears to reject it:

By distinguishing between those cases that involve hallucination and those that do not, the skeptic is not contradicting herself. She is not supposing that we know which cases are which. We may, with perfect consistency, both agree that there is a distinction between hallucinatory experience, which evokes false perceptual belief, and ordinary experience, which evokes true perceptual belief, and yet deny that we know which kind of experience we are having [Cornman, Lehrer, and Pappas (1992), p. 51].

But this line of reasoning falls prey to the same dilemma. Either we sometimes can tell that we’re not hallucinating, or we never can tell that we’re not. If we sometimes can, then in trying to establish skepticism the skeptic relies on a false Cartesian premise to the effect that we never can. On the other hand, if we never can tell that our current experience isn’t a hallucination, then we have no basis for holding that there really are distinct kinds of experience, normal and hallucinatory, that differ in their epistemic trustworthiness. True, we might be able to imagine an epistemically untrustworthy state of experience, one too much like normal experience for us ever to detect, but mere imagination establishes at most the logical or conceptual possibility of deception, which again doesn’t threaten fallible knowledge.

To put it the other way around, how could we learn from our experience of two distinct states that we can’t ever tell them apart? If the dream, hallucination, and illusion arguments begin where they purportedly do, with an a posteriori distinction between those states and genuine perception, then we must in general have experiential grounds for detecting those states, grounds denied to us by the skeptic’s claim about their undetectability. To respond that such states are at least conceivable is to claim no more than logical possibility for the skeptical scenario, rather than any grounding for it in our actual experience.11

To avoid relying on the claim that we have actually dreamed, a claim that skeptics must concede we have no reason to accept, skeptics might rely instead on the claim that dreaming is at least nomically possible, i.e., consistent with the laws of nature even if it never actually occurs. This move, however, obviously won’t work. The dream-skeptic in question here has conceded
that we have no justified empirical beliefs or empirical knowledge, and without either of those things we lack a proper grasp of what the laws of nature are or what they allow. We therefore have no grounds for regarding anything as nomically possible if, as the skeptic requires, “nomically possible” denotes a narrow category than “logically possible.” If we don’t know or justifiably believe anything about the external world, then we don’t know what counts as consistent with the laws of nature. The dream-skeptic is then faced, again, with the first horn of my dilemma, the claim that systematic error is logically possible, a claim that no fallibilist about knowledge should find threatening.

Another objection on the skeptic’s behalf goes like this: “Without having to assume mutually exclusive kinds of experience — dreaming and waking life — I can notice inconsistencies in my experience taken as a whole; these inconsistencies generate a skeptical worry all on their own, because they guarantee a priori that some of my experiences are illusory.” But in its appeal to “inconsistencies” in one’s experience, this objection also smuggles in empirical assumptions. For the only kind of inconsistency that guarantees falsity a priori is logical inconsistency, and the course of one’s experience does not — arguably, it could not — reveal logical inconsistency. The sentence “One second I was climbing Mt. Everest, and the next second I was snug in my bed” isn’t a logically inconsistent description of events, even if it is made unlikely by empirical facts about how fast people can move. “But five colleagues tell me that I wasn’t on Everest, since they saw me indoors at a conference all day.” This reply likewise assumes empirical facts. It assumes not only that you’re not merely dreaming the testimony of five colleagues but also that the testimony of five colleagues is more reliable than your first-person apparent recollection; both assumptions are deliverances of the senses and not of logic alone. Again, logically inconsistent experience, the only kind that guarantees falsity a priori, would be unintelligible — notwithstanding such things as Escher drawings of “impossible objects.” At the very least, logically inconsistent experience could not form the basis of an intelligible argument for skepticism.

Again, one might be tempted to say that the skeptic can run a reductio argument using the assumptions of common sense: “If the skeptic is allowed to appeal to what we believe to be actual, she doesn’t have to restrict herself to the first-person present perspective; she can argue that she can know that she has dreamed before, even though waking life and dreaming are indiscernible from the first-person present perspective — she can simply ask others what she was doing a moment ago if she thinks she might be dreaming then.” But this line again fails to appreciate the force of the dilemma facing the skeptic. How can someone who regards waking life and dreaming as subjectively indistinguishable, who regards herself as unable to tell them apart from her own perspective, at the same time reasonably rely on what she takes to be the testimony of other people? For all she takes herself to know, those people only inhabit her dreams.
Nor can the skeptic defend the specially realistic character of the dream alternative by reminding me that I at least seem to have had dreams, whereas I never even seem to experience envatment, the influence of the demon, or life in the Matrix. For, again, “I seem to have had dreams” means either of two (compatible) things: I have undergone experiences that are strange but — because they must be logically consistent with the rest of my experiences — need not on logical grounds be illusory; or I have undergone experiences that are probably illusory given empirical facts about the world, facts the skeptic insists I have no reason to accept in the first place. Furthermore, it may simply beg the question against the demon, vat, and Matrix arguments to claim that I never seem to experience those conditions, since according to these arguments such conditions are qualitatively just like whatever I seem to experience.

Carol White and Thomas Gillespie contend that Moore’s particular objection to the dream argument “is easily dismissed” [White and Gillespie (1982), p. 289], and so perhaps, by extension, is mine. Moore writes:

But can [the dream skeptic] consistently combine [the] proposition that he knows that dreams have occurred, with his conclusion that he does not know that he is not dreaming? Can anybody possibly know that dreams have occurred if, at the same time, he does not himself know that he is not dreaming? If he is dreaming, it may be that he is only dreaming that dreams have occurred. [Moore (1959), p. 249].

I take the last sentence to be the essence of Moore’s objection, an objection that has the intended force only if we interpret “only dreaming that dreams have occurred” as “falsely dreaming that dreams have occurred,” i.e., as dreaming that dreams have occurred when in fact they haven’t. On that interpretation, White and Gillespie correctly note, Moore’s objection is self-refuting:

If I am dreaming that I have had dreams qualitatively indistinguishable from my present experience, then I have had a dream — namely, the one I am having now — and my present experience is qualitatively indistinguishable from a dream I have had. If Descartes is dreaming when he thinks that dreams have happened, then at least one has happened. His present experience would be qualitatively indistinguishable from a dream, and this is all we need for the Dream Argument to work [White and Gillespie (1982), pp. 289-290].

My objection, by contrast, doesn’t depend on assuming that one might falsely dream that dreams have occurred. It assumes only this: if the dream alternative is to be more than merely a logical possibility, then it must be a realistic alternative, in which case the skeptic’s dream argument must attribute to us justified empirical beliefs of the very kind the argument must deny us. Notice, moreover, that White and Gillespie succeed in rebutting Moore’s misguided objection only at the cost of reducing the dream alternative to an a priori possibility in exactly the mould of the demon, vat, and Matrix alternatives. On their handling of it, the dream alternative becomes a mere logical
possibility — \textit{viz.}, that all of our experiences have been illusory — that we allegedly can’t rule out on \textit{a priori} grounds.\textsuperscript{16} The very same interpretation appears in David and Jean Beer Blumenfeld’s defense of the cogency of the dream argument:

One who does not know whether he has actually had any dreams may still have the \textit{concept} of a dream.... Given this concept he is in a position to argue—quite apart from whether he has had any dreams—that it is logically possible that one should have a dream which is qualitatively indistinguishable from waking experience [Blumenfeld and Blumenfeld (1978), pp. 240-241, emphasis in original].

One might question the assumption that we could acquire the concept of dreaming without anyone’s ever having dreamed, but I needn’t question it. For the Blumenfelds’ interpretation treats the dream alternative as a merely logical or conceptual possibility and therefore a possibility that fails to threaten logically fallible knowledge of the external world.

Stroud, too, ends up assimilating the dream alternative and merely logically possible skeptical alternatives when he defends the dream argument against an objection from Thompson Clarke. According to Stroud, Clarke mistakenly assumes that the dream alternative must represent what Clarke calls a “plain” (rather than merely “philosophical”) possibility in order to do any skeptical work. Stroud counters that mere conceptual possibility is enough:

Here we come up against the difficult question how we can tell whether a certain thing is \textit{conceivable} or not .... [I]t seems to me that the [dream] possibility continues to make sense even if I go on to imagine that no one on the face of the earth or anywhere else … could ever know whether they were awake or dreaming…. On that view, whether I am dreaming or not is simply a question of which state I am in [Stroud (1984), pp. 270-273, emphasis added].

If, as Stroud comes close to conceding here, the dream alternative enjoys nothing more than logical possibility, then it leaves fallible knowledge untouched. The same lesson would apply to arguments from other epistemically disabling conditions, such as hallucination and illusion. To sum up the skeptic’s dilemma: if skeptical alternatives come to us purely \textit{a priori}, then they represent merely logical, and therefore unthreatening, possibilities; if, on the other hand, skeptical alternatives come to us \textit{a posteriori}, then the skeptic’s use of them is self-defeating.\textsuperscript{17}

\textit{Department of Philosophy}
\textit{Acadia University}
\textit{Wolfville, NS, Canada B4P 2R6}
\textit{E-mail: smaitzen@acadiau.ca}
Notes

1 Contrary to Wright (1991), p. 92, n. 7.
2 Wright’s recherché concept of warrant [Wright (1991), p. 95] strikes me as too convoluted to be a concept we ordinarily use, and it has also been criticized as unsatisfiable [Tymoczko and Vogel (1992), p. 544].
3 I include in the nihilistic category Frances (2004), which argues for skepticism from our inability to rule out the eliminative-materialist claim that we have no beliefs and therefore no knowledge (assuming that knowledge requires belief).
4 See also Pryor (2000), p. 517, making the same point.
5 A recent example is Pryor (2000).
6 Furthermore, to require that a knower’s evidence rule out all the logical contraries of a proposition he or she knows is to require that his or her evidence entail the truth of that proposition — a requirement that any fallibilist about knowledge will reject.
7 Levin (2000) argues that effective skeptical scenarios must be metaphysically possible and that the skeptic must provide evidence for their metaphysical possibility. I depart from Levin for two reasons: (1) the metaphysical possibility of error doesn’t threaten fallible knowledge, since — judging from (2000), p. 426 — what Levin means by “metaphysical” possibility is what I mean by “logical” possibility, namely, what Plantinga (1974) calls “broadly logical” possibility; and (2) I don’t know what could count as evidence for the metaphysical possibility of a scenario, other than evidence of its actual instantiation, that isn’t just evidence for its narrowly logical, or conceptual, self-consistency.
8 Descartes’s phrase “certain indications” is a red herring, since the alleged indiscernibility of waking life and dreaming is supposed to challenge one’s empirical knowledge whether or not knowledge requires being certain of what one knows. The skeptic’s premises say that I have no empirical knowledge unless I know I’m not dreaming and furthermore I never know I’m not dreaming. Certainty, as such, need not play any role in those premises.
9 Quine (1981), p. 22, suggests the possibility of a similar reductio argument for skepticism from the findings of natural science. I thank Richmond Campbell for the reference.
10 Compare Cornman, Lehrer, and Pappas (1992), p. 56: “Sometimes we can tell that we are hallucinating, but we have no way of telling that we are not.”
11 My epistemic objection to the dream argument and its ilk differs from the semantic objection famously raised by J. L. Austin and dismissed by Stroud, although my objection is compatible with Austin’s. According to Austin, if dreaming were indiscernible from waking life, then “the phrase ‘dream-like quality’ … would be perfectly meaningless, because applicable to everything. If dreams were not ‘qualitatively’ different from waking experiences, then every waking experience would be like a dream” (quoted in Stroud (1984), p. 47). I don’t know how much support anti-skeptics can get from leaning on the expression “dream-like quality,” but in any case I don’t accuse the skeptic of having to rely on a meaningless distinction between dreaming and waking life, any more than I accuse the skeptic of drawing a meaningless distinction between veridical experience, on the one hand, and demon-induced illusions on the other. Those distinctions make semantic sense, but the former distinction is dialectically off-limits to the skeptic unless it is essentially the same distinction as the latter one.
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12 Any apparent logical inconsistency in one’s experience of an Escher drawing can be resolved in various ways, including by rejecting the non-logical assumption that the experience in question is of a single physical object rather than two objects.

13 If you agree with Kant that causally inconsistent experience would also be a priori false, you should agree with him that such experience is likewise impossible to have, in which case the skeptic’s reply gets no help from Kant.

14 I owe this objection, verbatim, to an anonymous referee.

15 Shirley (1993), pp. 7-9, seems to endorse Moore’s criticism of the dream argument.

16 Another charge is that White and Gillespie’s interpretation of the dream alternative involves a misuse, or redefinition, of the ordinary concept of dreaming — the kind of charge leveled by Austin in the quotation I discuss in note 11 above.

17 For helpful comments, I thank Andrew Graham, Mark Mercer, and my audiences at Dalhousie University, the University of Edinburgh, and the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meetings.

REFERENCES


